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Abstract 
This paper studies the determinants of the willingness to pay (WTP) for long term 
care (LTC) coverage provided through either a public or a private insurance 
program. Two insurance services are considered, a first one compulsory and 
financed out through general taxes, another one purchased on a voluntary base and 
paid through an insurance premium. Data are taken from a survey on a sample of 
households of the Italian region Emilia Romagna, and WTP is elicited through 
open-ended contingent valuation questions. We model individual choice as a two 
stage process, with respondents first establishing their interest for the service, then 
stating how much they are willing to pay. Auxiliary information allows us to separate 
zeros arising from standard corner solutions from those generated by disinterest. We 
test for independence of the interest” process by estimating Heckman’s sample 
selection models both for the public and private case. We show that two sequential 
processes guide the observed WTP and that their separate identification is crucial for 
a clear understanding of individual choices. Interest and WTP are influenced by 
different variables, whereas the same variables influence the two choices in different 
ways. Moreover, we are able to investigate the differences in stated WTP between 
public and private provision. The kind of information provided is useful for 
designing reforms that more closely match collective preferences in a particularly 
delicate area such as elderly care financing. 
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1. Introduction 
The financial impact of ageing is one of the most debated 
issues in health economics nowadays. A large number of studies has 
tried to assess the impact of demographic changes on different areas 
of welfare expenditures, including Long Term Care (LTC, 
henceforth) (e.g. Jacobzone et al., 1998). Fortunately, pessimistic 
scenarios suggested by projections that matched current dependency 
rates with the future demographic composition of the population 
have been significantly mitigated by the progressive reduction in the 
incidence of disability per age group (Cambois and Robine, 1997). 
However, even with a persistent degree of uncertainty (Hancock et al., 
2003), it is still agreed that ageing will increase the demand for elderly 
care in the future. Moreover, the rise in female job participation, 
together with the reduction in household’s size, will presumably 
further limit the availability of unpaid informal care. Hence, if we 
consider that an increasing amount of public resources will be 
absorbed by the raise in acute care costs, it is likely that families will 
be forced to increase their expenditures for LTC services.  
Despite the possibility to transfer the financial risk of age-
related disabilities through insurance schemes, the market for LTC 
private policies is negligible in size and elderly people are often 
exposed to a high expenditure risk. Several theoretical arguments 
have been proposed as possible explanations for this phenomenon.1 
They include adverse selection and moral hazard typically affecting 
health insurance, as well as market failures which are peculiar of the 
LTC sector and are attributable to intrafamily strategic behaviour 
(Pauly, 1990; Zweifel and Struwe, 1998) or to the presence of 
undiversifiable aggregate risk (Cutler, 1993). A further justification is 
the availability of substitutes such as out-of-pocket payments or 
public programs that cover expenditures and/or directly provide 
elderly care which may crowd out private insurance. The decision to 
pay at the point of need does not determine per se a socially inefficient 
outcome. However, sub-optimal risk transfer may still occur. This 
                                                          
1 See Norton (2000) for a survey. 
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happens, for instance, when myopic behaviour leads individuals at 
early stage of life to underestimate risk and consequences of 
disabilities, or when they strategically choose sub-optimal level of 
coverage because they rely on public intervention of last resort. 
The lack of coverage for LTC expenditures is relevant not 
only to the US, where the risk of illness is mostly handled through 
private insurance, but also to countries which extensively rely on 
public financing of health and social care, and where an increasing 
pressure towards the restraint of public expenditures is progressively 
widening the gap between people needs and the scope for public 
intervention.  
A large exposition to LTC expenditure risk is frequently 
perceived as a relevant social problem since a long period of disability 
affects a relatively limited number of individuals, but it may have 
catastrophic consequences on the assets of the families involved. 
Moreover, economic problems are usually only a side-effect of the 
heavier burden represented by physical frailty. This explains why 
equity reasons are considered with particular attention in this area and 
usually call for a substantial degree of socialisation of disability-related 
risk.  
All these factors have contributed to bring at the forefront of 
the policy agenda the issue of how to find additional resources for 
financing LTC. Different measures have been proposed and 
implemented, ranging from an increase in private saving (Garber, 
1996), to public-private partnerships for the diffusion of LTC 
insurance policies (Mc Call et al., 1998), as well as the creation of new 
public programs or the extension of the existing ones. The solutions 
proposed for the different countries are influenced, on the one hand, 
by the features of existing health and social care systems; on the other 
hand, they reflect different views on what should be the most 
appropriate way to split the financial burden for elderly care between 
individual and social responsibilities.  
What is largely missing in the literature is a direct 
investigation of people preferences over the amount of LTC risk that 
they are actually willing to transfer and over their preferred 
institutional arrangement for achieving such result. Our paper 
contributes to filling this gap by means of a unique survey on a 
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representative sample of families in the Italian region Emilia 
Romagna. Together with information on socio-economic and health 
status, we have collected data on stated willingness to pay (WTP) for 
an hypothetical program covering LTC expenditures, aimed at 
topping up the interventions already ensured by the public sector. We 
have used an open ended question format to ask each interviewed his 
or her maximum WTP for two alternative packages differing only in 
the way they are financed. The first question concerns a private 
insurance policy individually purchased in the market, whereas the 
second one is for a public fund financed out of taxation. 
The complexity of implementing comprehensive 
interventions in this area may create problems to some community 
members for properly assessing the benefits they would get from new 
programs. Therefore, the decision not to contribute to financing LTC 
cover may be determined not only by the comparison between 
individual expected costs and benefits, but also by prior judgements 
that reflect non-economic motivations.2 We control for potential 
distortions arising from mixing answers determined by the two 
different motivations (broadly speaking, economic and non-
economic) by way of a two step modelling of WTP. First, the process 
which leads to the inclusion of LTC coverage in respondents’ choice 
sets is identified, then the determinants of WTP on the sub-sample of 
interested individuals are studied. 
Our analysis is relevant from several viewpoints. First, by 
detecting the presence of unmet demand for coverage, it is attested 
that market failures are a relevant issue in practice. This adds an 
empirical rationale to public action, either in the form of public 
provision or through policy measures favouring the diffusion of 
private covers. Secondly, studying the determinants of demand for 
LTC coverage permits a better understanding of the welfare 
implications of potential reform interventions. Finally, given the 
existence of alternative policy options open to the policymaker, useful 
evidence is gained on how different institutional solutions are 
                                                          
2 Among the elements that may induce respondents not even to take into 
consideration the perspective of insuring against LTC risk we can include lack 
of adequate prior information, cognitive difficulties in evaluating the problem, 
but also a strong ethical commitment in favour of family caregiving. 
 5
perceived by the population. This is important both on a normative 
and on a positive perspective. In the former case, it helps to identify 
the mode of intervention which determines larger improvements in 
social welfare (by matching collective preferences), whereas in the 
latter case it provides insights on the most likely outcome of a 
political process in which the choice is between competing 
alternatives. 
The paper relates to three main strands of literature. The 
estimation strategy draws on the literature which deals with micro-
data characterised by a large share of zeros. We also provide evidence 
that complements, with stated preferences data and in a context of a 
dominant public health insurer, the studies on the determinants of 
demand for LTC insurance which until now mainly refer to the US 
(Sloan and Norton, 1997; Mellor, 2001). Besides, we contribute to the 
contingent valuation studies applied to health care. This literature has 
concentrated mainly on providing a monetary quantification of 
benefits derived from alternative health care interventions, so as to 
complement clinical indicators.3 More recently, analyses based on 
hypothetical markets have also been used to study problems related 
to elderly care (e.g. Johannesson and Johansson, 1997; Nocera, 
Bonato and Telser, 2002; Shackley and Donaldson, 2002). 
Nonetheless, applications of this methodology to elicit collective 
preferences on broader health care financing issues and on insurance 
coverage are very limited (exceptions are Eckerlund et al. 1995; 
Johannesson, Johansson and Soderqvist, 1998) and we are not aware 
of any contribution dealing with long term care insurance so far.  
The paper is organised as follows. The next section describes 
the structure of the survey, section 3 discusses the methodical 
framework and the estimation procedure, the results of which are 
presented in the section 4, and section 5 concludes. 
2. Survey and data description  
The analysis presented here is based on a cross-sectional 
survey carried out on a sample of families of the Italian region Emilia 
                                                          
3 For surveys of this literature see Diener, O’Brien and Gafni (1998), Klose 
(1999) and Hanley, Ryan and Wright (2003).  
 6
Romagna (around 3.5 millions inhabitants). The survey, consisting in 
1415 face-to-face interviews, was conducted by a professional survey 
firm between October and December 2002. Households were 
selected according to a design aimed at ensuring geographic and 
socio-economic representativity of the sample. A total of 41 
municipalities was surveyed, including all the 21 towns with more 
than 25,000 inhabitants, together with a sample of 20 smaller 
municipalities, which were selected by taking into account size, 
demographic composition and present supply of elderly care. Next, 
families were randomly drawn from municipal archives according to 
two characteristics which are a priori expected to influence the 
demand for LTC coverage, namely family size and age of the head of 
household.4  
2.1. Contingent valuation scenario and individual choice 
A specific section of the questionnaire is devoted to elicit the 
WTP for covering LTC expenditure risk. The hypothetical scenario 
consists of a program aimed at covering a respondent’s "disability 
state requiring help in activities for daily living for several hours per 
day ". This program covers 75% of disability related expenditures, 
which are supposed to amount to 1033 Euros per month if the 
disable is cared at home and to 1550 Euros if he chooses residential 
care.5  
Two different types of coverage are proposed for the same 
hypothetical scenario. A first one where cover is provided by the 
public sector to the whole population and financed through a 
                                                          
4 Three classes were considered for each feature. Family size included 1, 2, 3 or 
more components, whereas age classes were 25-40, 41-55 and 56-70. 
5 The health conditions described in the scenario are such that both home and 
institutionalised care can be considered appropriate from a medical point of 
view. Hypothetical monetary costs are consistent with current average out-of-
pocket expenditures for this kind of LTC services in Italy. Since our study 
focuses on the ex-ante choice of insurance, it is irrelevant whether ex-post the 
disable chooses domicile or residential care. A specific analysis of WTP for 
acquiring the right of a free choice between different solutions in care delivery 
will be the object of future work. 
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compulsory marginal increase in personal income tax. A second one 
in which insurance is voluntarily purchased in the market and paid 
through a premium. Hence, each respondent provides two WTP 
declarations. More precisely, the policy issue investigated here is the 
“WTP for an extension of coverage with respect to the status quo”. 
Therefore, respondents are asked to consider these expenditures net 
of the support presently ensured by the public sector, which currently 
takes different forms ranging from in-kind to cash subsidies, but that 
is considered to a large extent insufficient to meet present and future 
needs. 
Useful indications on the factors potentially influencing 
respondent’s decision can be derived both from economic theory on 
insurance choice and from the studies on long term caring 
arrangements. Expected utility of extending coverage depends on 
respondents’ perceived risk of disability and on monetary and non-
monetary costs generated by the provision of care, which, when no 
cover is available, must either be paid out of pocket or supplied 
through uncompensated family assistance. 
Age, sex and family composition are all expected to play a 
role in the propensity to cover of the individual, although 
counteracting effects might be in place in some cases. For instance, 
since disabilities concentrate at final stages of life, one can expect 
older respondents to be more interested in extending their coverage. 
At the same time, uncertainty over future availability of public 
resources for facing increased social needs can induce younger 
generations to see with favour new programs aimed at channelling 
additional investments in these potentially critical areas. From a 
different perspective, the presence of a spouse and of adult children 
raise the possibilities to receive informal support, thus reducing 
expected differential utility from coverage. This effect is reinforced if 
children live in the household and if the spouse is female.  
Conflicting effects can take place also for health related 
variables. In principle, poor health increases expenditure risk and 
consequently also the benefits from insurance. Nonetheless severely 
impaired people may perceive that their condition entitles them to 
receive free care, inducing them to support the status quo.  
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Economic conditions are expected to be among the most 
important determinants of the amount of WTP. Given the different 
distributive implications of the two system of provision considered, 
we also expect a different impact between the public and private 
solution. Finally, in contexts with a dominant public supplier of 
health care, empirical studies have highlighted the importance of 
political beliefs in influencing support towards additional welfare 
expenditures and decisions over purchasing supplementary medical 
insurance (Brook, Hall and Preston, 1998; Besley, Hall and Preston, 
1999). In this perspective, political attitudes are a multidimensional 
issue which involves judgements on the actual quality of public 
services, as well as personal opinions about the role that the public 
and the private sector should play in areas such as health and social 
care, where equity issues are particularly critical. All these aspects are 
controlled for in our empirical model. 
2.2. The dataset 
The questionnaire contains information on family 
composition, socio-economic status, working and health conditions, 
and on respondent's general attitudes towards health and social 
expenditures, which in principle can be used for modelling the 
propensity to cover LTC risk and for identifying the determinants of 
WTP. 
 9
 
Table 1: Definition and descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regression 
analysis 
Variable Definition Average 
(share of 1) 
Std 
Dev 
Log of Income Log of family income (PR*+ PR spouse, if 
present) 
7.46 0.48 
Age Age of PR in years 48.99 12.74 
Male = 1 if PR is a male, =0 if PR is a female (0.55) 0.50 
Spouse = 1 if PR is married, 0 otherwise (0.72) 0.45 
University degree  = 1 if PR has a university degree , 0 otherwise (0.14) 0.35 
Secondary school  = 1 if PR has a secondary school degree, 0 
otherwise 
(0.41) 0.49 
Compulsory education = 1 if PR has a compulsory education degree, 0 
otherwise 
(0.43) 0.50 
White Collar = 1 if PR is a white collar employed, 0 otherwise  (0.25) 0.43 
Blue Collar = 1 if PR is a blue collar employed, 0 otherwise (0.13) 0.34 
Other = 1 if PR is neither employed nor retired , 0 
otherwise  
(0.02) 0.15 
Retired = 1 if PR is retired , 0 otherwise (0.27) 0.44 
Not Working = 1 if PR is not working , 0  otherwise (0.12) 0.33 
Not good health during 
last year 
= 1 if PR self assessed health is rated excellent or 
fairly good, 0 otherwise 
(0.23) 0.42 
Chronic disease = 1 if PR suffers of one or more chronic diseases, 
0 otherwise 
(0.20) 0.40 
Negative  opinion of 
existing LTC services 
= 1 if PR declared a bad judgement of existing 
LTC services 
(0.54) 0.50 
No opinion on existing 
LTC services 
= 1 if PR did not declared any opinion of existing 
LTC services 
(0.23) 0.42 
Private  health insurance = 1 if  PR holds a supplementary health 
insurance, 0 otherwise  
(0.20) 0.40 
State should pay only 
basic services to all 
= 1 if PR thinks that the State should pay basic 
LTC to everybody, 0 otherwise 
(0.47) 0.50 
State should pay only to 
those who can't afford 
= 1 if PR thinks that the State should pay basic 
LTC services only to the poor, other citizens 
should provide by themselves, 0 otherwise 
(0.31) 0.46 
Person with LTC in the 
family 
= 1 if there is a disabled person in the family, 0 
otherwise 
(0.24) 0.43 
    
* PR= person responding to the survey 
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Table 1 reports definitions and descriptive statistics for the 
variables used in the empirical model. We have data on net monthly 
family income, that sums up respondent and (when present) spouse 
income. Next, we have variables describing respondent’s socio-
demographic conditions such as age, sex, and dummies for education 
and working position. The health condition is proxied by self-
assessed health status and by the presence of one or more chronic 
diseases.6 An additional set of dummies is included to capture 
respondent’s judgement on the perceived quality of health and social 
services.7 We also have dummy indicators aimed at capturing 
respondent’s awareness of the medical and financial impact of 
disability, namely having a disable person in the family. Finally, we 
include respondent’s opinion on the appropriate role of the public 
sector in financing LTC. Different groups are considered, from 
supporters of universal intervention (the base case considers that the 
State should pay for the entire scope of LTC services for everyone) to 
supporters of progressively more selective schemes (coverage of the 
basic services to the entire population and coverage of the basic 
services only for the poor). 
3. Estimation issues in evaluating WTP for long term care. 
The analysis of the determinants of WTP for LTC is based on 
the contingent valuation questions discussed above. As outlined in 
the introduction, our dataset contains two WTP statements (one for 
the private LTC coverage and one for the publicly funded one). 
Together with that, a variable which registers the asserted interest (or 
non interest) for these kind of coverage is recorded. In fact, strictly 
positive WTP for at least one of the two options (public fund or 
private insurance) is sufficient for being classified as interested. 
However, recording WTP=0 in both cases does not necessarily imply 
that a household excludes LTC coverage from his choice set, since 
                                                          
6 Respondents could rate their health state on a scale ranging from 1 (very bad) 
to 5 (excellent). The dummy variable employed here separates individuals with 
condition ranging from 4 to 5 from the rest of the population. 
7 In the survey, judgements on the quality of health and social care vary on a 
ordinal scale from 1 to 5. As for health state, in both cases we group together 
individuals whose evaluation is between 1-2 and those between 3-5.  
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the offer can be withdrawn also because the present level of income 
or of other individual variables induces the potential consumer not to 
allocate any expenditure to LTC cover. The auxiliary information 
available in the dataset allows us to identify non interested 
households within the group of respondents with zero WTP for both 
options.  
 
Table 2: Mean and median willingness to pay for the private and public solution 
 
 Totals Positive WTP Zero WTP 
 Obs. Mean WTP  
in Euros 
(std. dev.) 
Obs. Mean WTP 
in Euros 
(std. dev.) 
Obs. Interested 
Obs 
       
PRIVATE 
POLICY 
1257 290.77 
(418.12) 
724 504.10 
(442.98) 
533 282 
       
PUBLIC 
PROGRAM 
1257 282,67 
(371, 64) 
849 418.01 
(401.28) 
408 157 
 
Table 2 reports mean and median WTP for the private and 
public solution, first including the entire sample, then only those 
observations displaying a strictly positive WTP. The last section on 
the right of the table reports the number of zero-stated WTP in each 
institutional arrangement, together with the number of respondents 
who declare to be interested in LTC coverage despite their null WTP. 
As can be seen, there is a large proportion of zero WTP for both the 
public and private solutions.  
The problem of dealing with zero-inflated data has been 
extensively studied in the literature both on sample selection bias and 
double-hurdle models (e.g. Leung and Yu, 1996) and it has found 
frequent applications in the health care sector (see Maddala, 1985; and 
Jones, 2000, for surveys). From a methodological point of view, 
studies on tobacco consumption (Jones, 1989; Garcia and Labeaga, 
1996; Jones and Yen, 2000; Lahiri and Song 2000; Jones and Labeaga, 
2003) are of particular relevance for the analysis presented here.  
The literature has pointed out that a concentration of the 
mass probability at zero stems from four main motivations: 
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infrequency of purchase, rationing, standard corner solutions and 
aversion to a particular good (also referred to as preference 
heterogeneity or abstention). Neither the first nor the second issue 
play a major role here.8 On the contrary, the distinction between the 
last two sources of zeros is central to our analysis. Given the nature 
of the decision process analysed, we claim that statements of zero 
WTP arise here either from disinterest or standard corner solutions.  
In the first case, respondents may decline additional coverage 
because the service does not provide them benefits in any case, and 
consequently it is excluded from their choice set 
(disinterest/aversion). Alternatively, individuals may choose not to 
finance additional coverage simply because their actual level of 
income, or of other individual attributes, induces them to totally 
divert available resources to other expenditures (corner solution). Our 
distinction between interested and non-interested respondents 
partially recalls the idea developed by Propper (1993) for 
supplementary health insurance, who classifies respondents as 
“captive” to the National Health Service when households not 
holding a supplementary policy assert not to have seriously 
considered to purchase it. In our context, the broader concept of 
interest seems more appropriate than captivity, since individual 
attitude does not reflect a specific aversion towards either the public 
or the private solution, but more general considerations on the 
potential benefits which the consumer derives (or does not derive) 
from extending LTC coverage.  
3.1 Economic determinants of interest and WTP  
A separate identification of the determinants of interest and 
of stated expenditures is of primary importance not only because it 
allows for achieving unbiased and/or more efficient estimates of the 
parameters, but also because rather different economic and non-
economic factors are expected to influence the two processes. The 
                                                          
8 The first one typically involves expenditures on durable goods (e.g. Deaton 
and Irish, 1984; Blundell and Meghir, 1987; Keen, 1986), while the second 
relates to supply side hurdles (e.g. prices) which are absent here, since our 
exercise is based on open ended questions. 
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importance of this distinction mainly relies on the different expected 
responses to financial incentives. In general, respondents whose 
decision not to consume results from standard corner solutions are 
expected to choose positive consumption levels at different income 
or prices. On the contrary, when the decision not to consume stems 
from aversion or disinterest for the service, changes in financial 
incentives are not expected to modify expenditure allocations. 
It turns out that the distinction has substantial effects also in 
terms of policy prescriptions. For instance, subsidies which favor the 
diffusion of private policies (e.g. tax allowances on insurance premia) 
are not expected to influence the behaviour of non interested 
households, who do not intend to purchase additional coverage in 
any case. On the contrary, the same measures can be effective for 
potential consumers who currently are staying out of the market 
because of budget constraints. Relevant implications emerge in a 
public choice perspective as well. Interested households with zero 
WTP are de facto asking for exemption from the contribution but are 
not opposing the new program in itself, as it happens for the not 
interested. This kind of information provides the policymaker with 
new opportunities for designing programs with higher probabilities to 
achieve a broad political support. For instance, if interested zeros are 
concentrated in the left tail of the income distribution, a substantial 
progressivity in the contribution schedule, eventually including 
exemptions for individuals below some income threshold, may induce 
these groups to support the program, rather than opposing it as 
suggested by their zero WTP.  
There are specific behavioural motivations which illustrate 
why individuals may display heterogeneous preferences for an 
extension of LTC coverage. Since age related disabilities affect only a 
small fraction of the population, respondents might have an 
extremely vague perception of the problem and they do not feel 
personally involved in the definition of strategies for financing LTC. 
This can happen in particular to those who have never experienced a 
direct contact with disable elderly people. Moreover, this is a delicate 
area of intervention that one might not want to delegate to somebody 
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outside the family.9 If this is the case, insurance coverage provides no 
benefit since the only way that is considered admissible to take care of 
the elderly is through informal family care.10 
This kind of considerations allow us to argue that, in 
principle, interest is mainly driven by the awareness of the relevance 
of the topic achieved thanks to prior life experience, whereas the 
subsequent decision on how much to contribute to the private and 
public programs is mostly influenced by economic conditions, 
together with general attitudes about the way social services should be 
financed. Also factors like health status, age, education or personal 
experience of LTC cases are expected to play a role in making 
households interested in the service.  
Some of these variables which potentially influence 
participation are also likely to be important determinants of how 
much to pay for the two types of coverage. In a selectivity 
framework, such eventuality prevents them from being good 
statistical identification variables for the first process.11 In particular, 
socio-demographic variables are more prone to enter in this category. 
On the contrary, indicators of a direct experience of LTC needs, and 
judgments on the presently available services, are likely to raise 
interest since they reflect more accurate information on the 
consequences of disability, whereas they do not necessarily influence 
the amount of money individuals are willing to pay. In particular, we 
expect that in our hypothetical exercise, where the insurance package 
is defined in advance and coverage does not vary with the amount of 
the contribution. 
                                                          
9 See Joesch and Heidemann (2002) for a similar argument applied to child care. 
10 In principle, we cannot exclude that some respondents reject the offer simply 
because of difficulties in understanding the scenarios submitted to them or 
because they judge the interview too invasive. However, the notion of 
preference heterogeneity that we adopt is wider than the one implied by a mere 
protest attitude, that is frequently analysed in the empirical studies based on 
hypothetical data. See Bateman et al. (2002), for methodological considerations, 
and Dalmau-Matarrodona (2001), for an application to health services. 
11 Although not strictly necessary when estimating a parametric model, in order 
to achieve a proper identification of the two processes, it is strongly suggested 
that at least one regressor enters the participation equation but not the 
consumption one (e.g. Maddala, 1983, Vella, 1998). 
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3.2. Econometric specifications for health insurance demand 
By moving to estimation considerations, the consequence of 
the problem discussed above is that empirically observed zeros can be 
divided in two groups. The first group collects individuals who are 
not interested in the extension of LTC cover. The second group 
includes those who, despite being interested in coverage, are not 
willing to pay a positive amount for it.  
The main idea behind our set-up is that two hurdles, which 
typically receive a latent variable interpretation, must be passed in 
order to observe a positive stated expenditures for covering LTC risk.  
 
i. A “participation” hurdle, that identifies potentially interested 
consumers and is described by a participation equation with a binary 
outcome. Namely, the net value for an individual of expressing 
interest in coverage is summarized through the latent variable 
specification: 
(1)    iii vI += γz '* ; 
 
where zi includes the observable factors determining Ii*. 
What we observe is instead a dichotomous indicator Ii such that: 
 
(2)   
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧ >=
otherwise,0
iff,1 ' ii
i
v
I
γz
   
 
ii. A “(stated) expenditures” hurdle, which includes only the sub-sample 
of respondents who potentially receive a positive utility from 
extending LTC coverage, summarized through the following latent 
variable WTP* ≡ yi*, which measures the net value obtained from the 
service: 
(3)   i
'
ii uy += βx* . 
 
The corresponding stated WTP yi is given by:  
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(4)  
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧ >=
otherwise,0
iff,* i
'
ii
i
uy
y
βx
. 
 
In terms of observed data, a positive WTP identifies the price 
which makes the individual indifferent between purchasing and not 
purchasing the service. On the contrary, a WTP equal to zero 
corresponds to rejecting coverage at any price level. Respondents 
with this stated WTP are failing either the first hurdle (non-interested 
group) or the second one (interested but not willing to contribute).  
When no information is available for separating interested 
and non interested zeros, and the sole observed difference in the data 
is between zeros and positive values, a general specification for the 
likelihood is given by the “double hurdle model with dependence” 
(e.g. Jones, 1989). 
 
(5) 
( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( ) ( )zγxβzγxβzγ
zγxβzγ
'''''
'''
−>−>−>−>−>×
×−>−>−>−=
∏
∏
+
vuygvupvp
vupvpLDHD
,||
|1
0 , 
 
where p and g respectively are distribution and density functions of 
probability. Such likelihood requires the estimation of bivariate 
normal distributions and density functions. This computational 
difficulty has been commonly overcome by assuming independence 
between the two data generation processes.12  
Differently from standard double hurdle models where 
different sources of zeros are usually not directly observable (e.g. 
Jones, 1992; Garcia and Labeaga, 1996), in our case the separation 
between participants and non participants is achieved by means of 
                                                          
12 The independence assumption leads to what is usually referred to as Cragg’s 
model. Cragg’s (1971) two stage model of consumption was motivated by the 
need to overcome the inadequacy of the univariate Tobit model to describe 
situations where different factors affect the decision whether or not to purchase 
a certain good and how much to spend for it. 
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supplementary information which allows us to identify non interested 
respondents within the group of those with zero WTP for both the 
public and the private program. We can therefore write a likelihood 
function which takes into account not only the standard distinction 
between zero and positive observations, but also splits the sample 
between interested and not interested individuals. By rearranging 
terms within the previous expression we have: 
 
(6) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( ) ( )zγzγxβzγxβ
zγxβzγzγ
'''''
''''
−>−>−>−>−>×
×−>−>−−>×−>−=
∏
∏∏
+
vpvupvuyg
vupvpvpL
INI
DHSS
|,|          
|1 1
00
 
where 0NI and 0I respectively are the “zero non interested” and “and 
zero interested” observations.  
Equation (6) is a new version of the full double hurdle model, that 
exploits supplementary information for separating zero WTP between 
the interested and non interested group. The expressions gets more 
appealing when introducing independence as in the Cragg’s model. In 
this case the joint probabilities reduce to the marginals, so that 
equation (6) simplifies to: 
 
(7)    
( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( ) ( )xβxβzγ
xβzγzγ
'''
'''
−>−>−>×
×−>−−>−>−=
∏
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+
uygupvp
upvpvpL
INI
DHSS
|          
11
00 . 
 
By rearranging the terms within the previous expression we 
finally have: 
 
(8)   
( )[ ] ( )
( )[ ] ( ) ( )⎭⎬⎫⎩⎨⎧ −>−>−>−×
×−>−>−=
∏∏
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+
xβxβxβ
zγzγ
'''
''
uygupup
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I
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DHSS
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1
0
. 
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The latter expression better shows how sample separation allows for 
articulating the estimation problem in likelihood function which 
composed of a probit estimation of the interest process (NI and I 
subscripts), and a standard Tobit equation for positive WTP and 
standard corner solutions (zero WTP of interested people). The 
estimation of model (8) is therefore nested into a more general 
double hurdle framework. In case of independent processes, the 
estimation procedure can be carried out separately: in a probit 
estimation of the interest process, and a standard Tobit equation for 
positive WTP and standard corner solutions. This is what we actually 
do in the next subsection. 
An estimation strategy of the kind described above draws on 
studies such as Jones (1989) and Jones and Labeaga (2003), where the 
sample separation between participating and non participating zeros 
is derived from information on past habits of currently non smokers. 
Namely, current non smokers are divided between those who have 
never smoked (classified as non participants) and those who have 
smoked in the past but have already quitted at the moment of the 
interview (participants but non-consumers).  
3.3. Estimation procedure  
A major obstacle to a straightforward application of the 
framework described in equation (6) to our problem is that the 
double hurdle model is appropriate to represent situations where 
decisions are taken jointly, since its multiplicative probabilistic 
structure does not identify a uniquely defined sequence of decisions 
(e.g., Smith, 2002). On the contrary, the two-stage decision process of 
the respondents to our survey embeds a sequential structure where 
participation, determined by previous experience on LTC issues, 
preexists to the WTP statement. More precisely, we have a common 
initial interest process which is followed by two separate statements 
(one for each of the programs considered), and these statements are 
only observed in the sub-sample of the interested population. The 
way we exploit the additional information concerning interest is 
therefore modified with respect to standard double hurdle models 
and fits consistently with the nature of our CV exercise. In particular, 
interest for LTC coverage, represented by equation (1), is to be 
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related to two structural equations like (4), one for the private policy, 
and one for the public program. As a consequence, the nature of the 
relationship between participation and (stated) expenditures must be 
studied in two different cases. In turn, also the determinants of WTP 
within the subsample of interested respondents have to be studied 
under the two different institutional arrangements. In order to 
simplify the overall problem, we assume independence for the 
stochastic components of the processes that determine WTP for the 
private and public program in the sample of interested people.  
We treat the interest process as a selectivity problem by 
means of Heckman’s (1979) two-step estimation method. The use of 
the two-step procedure is justified on the grounds of the intrinsically 
sequential nature of the process under analysis: a first common 
interest process, then two different structural equations for public and 
private LTC insurance coverage. A two-stage Heckman’s model for 
each of the two proposed solutions allows us to control for the 
potential selectivity imposed by the participation hurdle. If 
unobserved differences between the two groups are correlated with 
the relevant regressors, estimates run on the sub-sample of interested 
respondents would be biased.13 
Heckman two-step procedure, which augments the WTP 
equation with a term (the inverse mills ratio (IMS)) aiming to capture 
the correlation between unobserved heterogeneity in the interest and 
the WTP equations, represents the estimation bias on the sub-sample 
as an omitted variable problem. This allows for using the significance 
of the IMS as an independence test, i.e. as a test for the possibility to 
separately estimate a probit participation equation for interest, and 
tobit-type equations for modelling the WTP in the private and public 
case. That is: 
 
(9) ( ) ( )γz '1Prob iiI Φ== , 
 
where ( )⋅Φ  is the standard normal distribution function; and 
                                                          
13 As a consequence, it would be impossible to properly distinguish the effects 
of the relevant economic determinants discussed and presented in section 2 
from those arising from the differences across the two groups in the sample.  
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(10a) ( )PRPRiPRiy βx ',0max= , 
 
(10b) ( )PUPUiPUiy βx ',0max= , 
 
where PR and PU refer respectively to privately provided and public 
insurance schemes. 
4. Results 
In this section we implement the analytical framework 
described above by estimating two selectivity models, one for the 
private and one for the public coverage. As already remarked, the first 
stage estimates are common to both models In the second stage, 
stated WTP in natural logs for the private and public programs 
respectively is regressed against the control variables listed in table 1. 
All specifications include also two sets of dummies controlling for the 
municipality of residence of the respondent and for the identity of the 
interviewer. This prevents unobservable systematic differences in 
local conditions, or in the way the interview was administered to 
influence the results. The empirical results are presented in Table 3.14  
None of the estimated specifications present a significant 
coefficient for the inverse mills ratio and therefore we can take the 
participation and expenditure decisions as independent. Since lambda 
is never significant in the augmented specification of the 
consumption equation, selectivity is not an issue here. Such evidence 
suggests that studying the sub-sample of the interested will not lead 
to any bias in the determinants of stated preferences regarding WTP. 
This usually provides support to the idea of implementing OLS 
estimates on the sub-sample of the participant observations. 
However, in our set-up we still have to deal with corner solution 
observations, i.e. zero WTP declared by interested individuals. 
Consequently, we moved to the estimation of a probit equation for 
                                                          
14 Observations whose WTP exceeded sample average by more than four times 
the standard deviation were dropped in order to control for outliers. Due to 
missing information on family income, more 148 observations were dropped, 
leading to a total of 1257 interviews used for estimations. 
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the interest process as described in (1) and of two Tobit equations on 
the subsample of interested individuals for the private and public 
coverage. These estimates are presented and discussed in the 
following of the section.  
The first part of Table 3 below presents the coefficients and 
t-statistics for the decision of whether or not to participate in the 
demand for LTC coverage estimated on the whole sample. The 
second and the fourth part present Tobit estimates for private and 
public WTP estimated on the subsample of the interested, and in this 
case also the marginal effects for each equations are reported.  
The participation stage  
The reported results suggest that interest in coverage is 
mostly induced by variables related to LTC conditions rather than to 
standard demographic and economic characteristics. In particular, 
neither respondent’s age nor family income significantly influence the 
probability of being interested in the service. The coefficients for 
educational dummies display the expected increasing pattern, 
although differences with respect to the not educated class, chosen as 
base group, are significant only for respondents that have reached a 
university degree. Other variables controlling for family composition 
and for type of occupation do not show any significant effect. 
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Table 3: Econometric results 
 
 (1) Interest 
(Probit) 
(2) WTP Private 
(Tobit) 
(3) WTP Public 
(Tobit) 
 Coeff. 
(std err) 
t-stat Coeff. 
(std err) 
t-stat Marg 
Eff 
(dy/dx) 
Coeff. 
(std err) 
t-stat Marg 
Eff 
(dy/dx) 
Age -.002 -0.28 -.028** -2.24 -.025 .011 1.23 .011 
 (.006)  (.012)   (.009)   
Male .020 0.18 .173 0.75 .153 .464*** 2.80 .454 
 (.112)  (.230)   (.166)   
University  degree  .848** 2.11 1.321 1.38 1.205 1.438** 2.11 1.418 
 (.401)  (.956)   (.680)   
Secondary school  .520 1.40 1.471 1.59 1.312 1.377** 2.09 1.350 
 (.372)  (.926)   (.658)   
Compulsory 
education 
.404 1.13 1.321 1.44 1.179 1.371** 2.11 1.343 
 (.359)  (.914)   (.650)   
Log of Income -.156 -1.28 1.352*** 5.44 1.199 .897*** 5.02 .879 
 (.122)  (.249)   (.179)   
Blue Collar -.163 -0.91 -.474 -1.27 -.418 -.303 -1.11 -.296 
 (.179)  (.374)   (.273)   
White Collar -.115 -0.71 -.410 -1.30 -.361 .091 0.39 .089 
 (.163)  (.316)   (.230)   
Other -.025 -0.07 -.288 -0.38 -.253 210 0.38 .206 
 (.372)  (.750)   (.551)   
Retired -.306* -1.69 -.296 -0.78 -.261 -.0995 -0.37 -.097 
 (.181)  (.378)   (.272)   
Not Working -.073 -0.36 -.632 -1.58 -.550 -.423 -1.46 -.413 
 (.202)  (.400)   (.291)   
Not good health  -.241** -1.91 -.227 -0.79 -.200 -.383* -1.85 -.374 
 (.126)  (.288)   (.207)   
Chronic disease -.149  -1.11 -.625** -2.11 -.546 -.612*** -2.88 -.597 
 (.134)  (.297)   (.212)   
Subscriber of a 
private health 
insurance 
.313** 
(.147) 
2.13 .670*** 
(.262) 
2.56 .602 -.077 
(.192) 
-0.40 -.075 
State should pay 
basic LTC services to 
all 
.374*** 
(.131) 
2.86 .935*** 
(.292) 
3.20 .828 -.020 
(.209) 
-0.10 -.020 
State should pay 
basic LTC services 
only to the poor 
.219 
(.139) 
1.57 .650** 
(.320) 
2.03 .581 -.421* 
(.228) 
-1.85 -.412 
Negative opinion of 
existing LTC services 
.359*** 
(.139) 
2.58       
Presence of a disable 
in the family 
.232* 
(.126) 
1.84       
Constant 3.756** 2.35 -5.566 -2.28  -2.928* -1.66  
 (1.596)  (2.442)   (1.765)   
Observations 1257  1006   1006   
   (849 uncensored) (849 uncensored) 
*** 1% significance level 
** 5% significance level 
* 10% significance level 
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Conversely, an influential impact are provided by variables 
indicating some aspects more directly related to LTC and health 
issues. For the latter, remark how self assessed bad health conditions 
in the year preceding the survey are associated with a significantly 
lower probability of being interested. The result may appear 
somewhat counterintuitive, since poor health status increases the 
expected utility of insurance. Nonetheless the evidence is consistent 
with the empirical literature on the demand for private LTC and 
private health insurance policies based on revealed preferences. In 
those cases, the result is usually attributed to the presence of 
(unobservable) supply-side constraints that limit the possibility for 
people in a health state to contract with insurers. This conjecture is 
not maintainable for our analysis – being based on stated preferences 
– and this suggest that also demand side explanations should be 
considered. For instance, one can think that ill-health individuals are 
interested more in health care rather than in LTC services; or that, in 
the status quo, they consider themselves entitled to free care.  
A particularly important role is also played by the indicators 
that proxy the extent to which respondents are aware of the 
consequences of disability. We have argued in the previous section 
that these variables are expected to influence interest in coverage but 
not necessarily the WTP for a predefined program, whose degree of 
coverage does not change with the contribution. The respondent’s 
judgements on the quality of existing social care services does 
influence interest but not WTP, neither in the public nor in the 
private solution. In particular, households who give a negative 
evaluation of existing LTC services are more interested in channelling 
additional resources in this area. In this perspective, we can conclude 
that the proposed programs are seen as instruments to improve the 
quality of existing LTC services, especially by citizens who perceive it 
as currently inadequate.15 Variables capturing direct exposure to LTC 
issues such as having a disable person in the family are additional 
candidates to play the role of identifiers. Our results suggest that such 
indicator never proved to be significant in the WTP equation, 
                                                          
15 It is worth noting that neither the perceived quality of health care services nor 
considering health care as the first priority for new public expenditures 
significantly influence the probability of being interested.  
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whereas it is positively associated with the interest probability, 
although only at 10% of significance level. In light of the discussion 
in the previous section, we use both controls as identification 
variable, and we include them only in the first stage equation.  
We finally observe that also indicators which broadly reflect 
political opinions affect the interest probability. That political 
opinions influence demand patterns has pointed out in the literature 
on demand for supplementary health insurance (Propper, 1993; 
Besley, Hall and Preston, 1999), and our results confirm these 
findings also for LTC. In particular, we consider respondent’s 
opinion about the appropriate role of the public sector in LTC 
financing. The base case is represented by individuals who think that 
the state should provide free care to everybody independently of the 
income level, whilst the other categories include respondents whose 
favour progressively moves from universal to selective financing 
schemes. The results indicate that individuals who support a public 
intervention which ensures free care only for the basic services to 
everybody are more interested than those favouring universal 
provision for the entire scope of treatments. On the contrary, interest 
probability does not differ from this base case for respondents who 
agree with public intervention limited to means tested provision of 
basic services.  
The willingness to pay stage  
Interesting insights on the attitude towards LTC coverage can 
be derived from Tobit estimates for participating households. In 
particular, it is useful to check whether there are differences between 
the private and public case as well as to compare these results with 
the determinants of the interest process.  
The most relevant difference between the decisions taken in 
the first and in the second stage comes from the income variable 
which, differently from the impact on the probability of being 
interested, has a strong influence on WTP both in private and public 
solution. More in detail, as can be noted by inspection of the marginal 
effects, private coverage emerges as a luxury (income elasticity above 
1) while the public program is a normal good. In addition to a generic 
interpretation in terms of Engel curves, the result is consistent with 
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the idea that public programs are perceived as intrinsically more 
redistributive than private ones. By taking as a benchmark the amount 
the respondent is willing to contribute, it is reasonable that a wealthy 
respondent expects citizens in the lower tail of the income 
distribution to be asked to contribute less than he or she does, and 
viceversa. On the contrary, private insurance premiums do not vary 
with income but only with (observable) risk factors, and therefore 
they seems to be relatively more attractive for high income groups 
because they do not impose a cross subsidisation in favour of the 
poor. 
Demographic indicators such as age and sex affect in some 
cases the amount of the contribution whilst they had no role in 
determining interest. Again, differences between the private and 
public programs can be observed, with age being significant only in 
the former, and sex only in the latter case. The role of age deserves a 
particular attention since it signals a propensity by the younger 
generation to go private. The result can be rationalised in different 
ways. One can think of a general attitude that sees young people less 
oriented to attribute a central role to the public sector in the 
provision of welfare service.16 Alternative explanations more specific 
to the problem analysed here are that young households may perceive 
the sustainability of a public program more uncertain than older 
people do, given the longer time horizon over which they are likely to 
need coverage. Moreover, thanks to their better than average health 
status, they would be likely to get relatively better contractual 
conditions in the private sector with respect to older people, by this 
way reinforcing their favour for private insurance. 
Educational dummies are significant only in the public case 
and the coefficients are very similar to each other, suggesting that the 
only relevant difference is between people with no education (base 
case) and the rest of the population. Working status never influences 
the WTP, similarly to what happened in the first stage. Health 
conditions, measured either by self assessed health status or by the 
presence of chronic conditions, reduce willingness to contribute to 
                                                          
16 However, we expect that at least part of this generational effect, if present, is 
captured by the dummies reflecting political opinions. 
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both the private and the public program, similarly to what happened 
for interest probability. Coefficients in the two equations are pretty 
similar and chronic conditions reduce the contribution to a larger 
extent than what happens for poor self rated health. Since the former 
indicator better captures more serious conditions, the result supports 
the idea that the lower propensity for coverage derives from the belief 
of ill-health respondents of being entitled to free coverage in the 
status quo. It is also interesting to note that the presence of a health 
insurance policy increases the contribution for the private solution 
but not for the public one. The result indicates that the variable can 
be better interpreted as an indicator of preference for privately 
oriented solutions rather than as an indicator of a general propensity 
to cover health risks through insurance mechanisms. 
Finally, we observe a significant effect of the dummies 
reflecting the role the respondents do attribute to the public sector in 
financing LTC services. The impact works in different directions for 
the private and public case. As far as the public solution is concerned, 
no significant difference emerges between those who would like the 
public sector to make the entire range of service freely available to 
everybody (base case) and those supporting free provision only of 
basic services. Consistently with expectations, respondents who 
support free care only for those who cannot afford to pay, want to 
contribute significantly less with respect to the base case when 
coverage is provided by the public sector. On the contrary, a 
significantly higher WTP with respect to the hypothesis of free care 
for everybody emerges in case of private coverage.  
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we have studied WTP for LTC coverage on the 
base of a survey carried out on a representative sample of the 
population of the Italian region Emilia Romagna. This analysis sheds 
light on some aspects which have become crucial in the political 
agenda of many countries, related in particular on the nature of 
consensus which programs for extending LTC coverage may receive 
by public opinions. Our descriptive results confirm that there are 
substantial shares of the population (around one third) that are not 
willing to contribute to such programs, either because they are not 
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interested in the service or because they think they cannot afford it. 
At the same time, the remaining part of the population seems to be 
ready to increase expenditures to an extent which could ensure a 
substantial increase of the present level of coverage.  
The econometric analysis focuses on the determinants of 
WTP and consider two different coverage programs, one organised 
through private policies and one publicly financed. The availability of 
auxiliary information also allows us to split the sample of respondents 
between those who reject the proposal because they are not interested 
and the rest of the population. We estimates first two Heckman’s 
selectivity models, one for the private and one for the public solution, 
in order to control for the potential selection induced by the interest. 
The independence results obtained allow for the possibility to present 
separate estimations for the participation process, which consider the 
whole sample, and for the amount of expenditures, which only 
include interested respondents. 
The empirical results confirm the importance to separate the 
choice leading to the stated WTP in two steps since the variables that 
influence the probability of being interested in the service differ 
substantially from those that determine the amount of the 
contribution. The participation decision is mainly determined by 
indicators related to previous experience with LTC, whereas socio-
economic variables are more influential on the decision of how much 
to spend in coverage. This challenges the possibility to foster the 
subscription to voluntary programs simply by means of financial 
subsidies.  
A second relevant issue highlighted in the paper is the 
difference between the public and the private solution in the second 
stage decision. The income variable, which did not influence the 
interest probability, is particularly interesting in this perspective and 
plays a relevant role for both solutions, but with different patterns. 
The estimated coefficients reveal a higher effect for the private 
scheme, which emerges as luxury good, whereas the public solution is 
more clearly defined as a (weak) “necessity”. The likely presence of an 
“aversion to redistribution” effect is a challenging aspect for future 
theoretical and empirical investigations. Also the higher WTP by 
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youngest respondents for private programs is an interesting result 
which advocates for future better comprehension. 
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